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Abstract
This article explores how malaria control in sub-Saharan Africa is shaped in important ways by pol-
itical and economic considerations within the contexts of aid-recipient nations and the global
health community. Malaria control is often assumed to be a technically driven exercise: the remit
of public health experts and epidemiologists who utilize available data to select the most effective
package of activities given available resources. Yet research conducted with national and inter-
national stakeholders shows how the realities of malaria control decision-making are often more
nuanced. Hegemonic ideas and interests of global actors, as well as the national and global institu-
tional arrangements through which malaria control is funded and implemented, can all influence
how national actors respond to malaria. Results from qualitative interviews in seven malaria-
endemic countries indicate that malaria decision-making is constrained or directed by multiple
competing objectives, including a need to balance overarching global goals with local realities, as
well as a need for National Malaria Control Programmes to manage and coordinate a range of non-
state stakeholders who may divide up regions and tasks within countries. Finally, beyond the
influence that political and economic concerns have over programmatic decisions and action, our
analysis further finds that malaria control efforts have institutionalized systems, structures and
processes that may have implications for local capacity development.
Keywords: Political economy, malaria control, health policy, ideas, interests, institutions
Introduction
Political scientists studying health policy have noted that while pub-
lic health planning may commonly be framed as a rational techno-
cratic exercise in problem-solving, the realities of policymaking
rarely reflect this public health ideal (Bernier and Clavier, 2011).
Rather, authors have explained that there is a need to engage with a
number of political and economic factors to understand why and
how health policy decisions and outcomes come about outside the
evaluation of technical evidence alone—factors including aspects of
stakeholders and networks, power and influence, and governance or
institutional contexts (de Leeuw et al., 2014; Gilson et al., 2018).
Although those involved in health policy decisions are well aware
that they are acting within a number of political constraints, they do
not necessarily work to define or analyse them explicitly.
Malaria control represents one such example of a global health
priority that is commonly conceptualized as a technical public health
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issue. The World Health Organization (WHO) is the leading inter-
national actor providing advice and information on malaria control,
and identifies three principle strategies for malaria prevention: use
of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, indoor residual spraying (of in-
secticide) or chemo-prophylaxis (administering anti-malarial drugs
to key populations at particular times before exposure to prevent
malaria illness). The WHO further recommends malaria treatment
options through confirmed diagnosis and treatment in the health
system, or via community-based management strategies for under-
resourced areas (WHO, 2017). The overarching WHO guideline
document is itself titled the ‘Global Technical Strategy’ (WHO,
2015)—with such documents rarely including explicit consideration
of political aspects of malaria control (although there may be men-
tion of a need for political will). Decision-making for malaria con-
trol is therefore typically conceptualized as an exercise involving
review of evidence and modelling to inform decisions between com-
binations of interventions and strategies to maximize the chances of
control or, indeed, eventual elimination of malaria (Hemingway
et al., 2016; Tediosi et al., 2017).
While other global health issues have been the subject of signifi-
cant political analysis [HIV/AIDS being a notable example
(Seckinelgin, 2007; Poku and Whiteside, 2017)], malaria control
discussions often remain in this technocratic framing. It may be that
malaria is less frequently a feature of electoral politics in comparison
to apparently controvertial issues such as HIV/AIDS, abortion or
vaccination. However, there have been some examples of political
controversy around national malaria decisions explored in the aca-
demic literature (see Tesfazghi et al., 2016), and so it may be that
local politicization has simply not been the topic of analysis often,
even if it does exist. The fact that little has been written focused at
national levels to explore the dynamics of decision-making and im-
plementation for such an important public health issue, however,
provides an important justification for more exploratory politically
informed empirical work on this topic.
Indeed, in many ways, malaria control may be typical of a range
of global health issues for which there are established systems of
international donor and technical expert activity working to shape
decision-making and implementation, often without explicitly critic-
al political lenses being applied. Yet the activity of both donors and
global expert bodies has elsewhere been shown to bring their own
set of political economy concerns in the context of low- and middle-
income settings. For example, the roles of international actors and
donor bodies have been critiqued in terms of how they may shape
local agendas (Okuonzi and Macrae, 1995). The power and influ-
ence of global expertise have been highlighted as exercising power
without necessarily considering accountability concerns (Shiffman,
2014). And a number of works in the health and development sector
have shown how donor efforts may not account sufficiently for local
contexts, potentially imposing outside ideas and problem construc-
tions on recipient nations (Ferguson, 1994; Honig and Gulrajani,
2018).
It thus remains important to understand the political realities of
decision-making for health policy issues that may typically be
framed as technical exercises in decision-making, but for which local
and international contexts may play out in yet unexplored ways to
shape intervention choices and activities implemented to achieve
health goals. This paper arose from research nested within an expli-
citly technically oriented programme of work—the LINK-Data for
Decision-making programme. That programme supported 13 high-
prevalence countries to develop modelled malaria prevalence maps
and epidemiological profiles—working under the theory that pro-
viding National Malaria Control Programmes (NMCPs) with
improved epidemiological data (more recent and more specific maps
of the epidemiological context) would lead to more effective and ef-
ficient planning and resource allocation at a country level [mapping
methods can be found in Noor et al. (2014) and Snow and Noor
(2015)].
The LINK programme was specifically one that aimed to provide
evidence that could be useful to inform decision-making by allowing
decision-makers to target or prioritize particular geographic areas
and sets of interventions based on more up-to-date and more geo-
graphically specific knowledge of the local epidemiological situ-
ation. Yet while the technocratic instincts of the public health
community may often portray data and evidence in a depoliticized
fashion [as a technical tool that simply needs to be ‘used’ or ‘taken
up’ (Oliver et al., 2014)], public policy analyses of evidence use
within health policymaking have found that key political elements
such as how problems are framed, the interests of policy stakehold-
ers, or institutional arrangements governing decision-making can all
play important roles in shaping when, how or why certain forms of
evidence are utilized (Parkhurst et al., 2018).
Recognizing these realities, the LINK programme identified an
opportunity to explore more directly the political and economic fac-
tors that were influencing malaria decision-making across a set of
African countries being provided with data and evidence intended to
be useful for planning. This aimed to provide insights about
decision-making typically excluded from programmes providing
data for technical decision-making support, and further help con-
tribute to the broader understanding of malaria decision-making.
This paper provides results from analyses of qualitative interviews
conducted in LINK partner countries which enabled critical reflec-
tion on how and why particular malaria control decisions were
made outside of the simple technical review of data and evidence
alone. A broad and exploratory approach was taken, given the lack
of knowledge around malaria control specifically, combined with a
recognition of a large number of potential political concepts that
KEY MESSAGES
• National malaria control policies and actions are driven by more than simply technocratic reviews of evidence for specific intervention
strategies.
• The political economy of malaria control is influenced by: the interests of influential funders and implementing stakeholders; domin-
ant ideas in the global malaria community; and institutional arrangements shaping national policy and practice.
• Malaria funding concentrated into a small number of lenders, but a large number of implementers, may restrict national control over
planning and action.
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might provide insights into decision-making and implementation
choices.
Background
Malaria remains one of the most important infectious diseases glo-
bally, remaining in the top 10 causes of early death according to the
2017 Global Burden of Disease study (IHME, 2018). The World
Health Organization (WHO, 2019) has recently reported that pro-
gress in reducing malaria is now felt to be stalling, with 228 million
malaria cases estimated in 2018. In that year, 19 countries
accounted for 85% of the nearly half-million global malaria
deaths—with 18 of these countries located in sub-Saharan Africa.
The burden of the illness also primarily falls on the young, with ap-
proximately two-thirds (67%) of all malaria deaths occurring in
children under 5 (WHO, 2019).
However, the bulk of malaria financing is controlled by a small
number of actors. In 2018, national contributions from malaria-
endemic countries represented only 30.5% of total financing. The
USA, however, provided 37.3% of global malaria funding, and the
UK 9.2% in that year—with around half of international funding
channelled through the Global Fund for HIV, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (the Global Fund) (WHO, 2019). This raises important
concerns about the influence and role of international donors and
non-state stakeholders in shaping national policy and programme
outcomes.
Ultimately, malaria control responsibility falls to national gov-
ernments. At the country level, NMCPs are the key local agency
involved in planning and decision-making on the ground. They are
typically officially mandated parts of, or delegates of, Ministries of
Health (MoH) —expected to use available evidence to make stra-
tegic planning decisions on malaria control (Bryce et al., 1994;
Slutsker and Kachur, 2013). Yet with the vast burden of malaria
falling on resource-constrained countries, a wide range of other
stakeholders are typically involved in malaria decision-making at a
national level, including non-governmental / civil society organisa-
tions (NGOs/CSOs), research agencies, donors, international imple-
menting agencies and other government agencies. These agencies
may have differing established strategies, expertise or ideas on how
to respond to malaria, interacting with national bodies through for-
mal and informal structures and ultimately influencing policy deci-
sions and programmatic action.
These economic, global and domestic political realities raise
questions about what forces are driving malaria control decision-
making at the national level, and how various arrangements of
stakeholders and financing shape strategic and programmatic
decision-making beyond the policy and planning approaches of tech-
nical evidence review alone.
Methods
This paper explores these issues through a qualitative analysis of in-
depth interviews conducted as part of the evaluation process of the
LINK programme. This evaluation had multiple objectives. One of
these related more directly to evaluation of the utility and applica-
tion of the country profiles and national risk maps provided to coun-
tries (Ghilardi et al., 2020). Another spoke more explicitly to the
question of what ‘evidence use’ means from the programmatic per-
spective of NMCPs (Parkhurst et al., 2020) (results under review
elsewhere). In this paper, we provide results from the evaluation ob-
jective which aimed to explore the political factors shaping malaria
control decisions, outside of the simple review of technical evidence
alone.
Qualitative interviews were conducted between April 2018 and
July 2018 with a total of 177 stakeholders based in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Sierra
Leone, Uganda and in global agencies. Purposive sampling was
undertaken to capture a range of perspectives of individuals
involved in evidence provision, decision-making and implementa-
tion of malaria programmes. It included representatives of govern-
ment agencies, non-governmental organizations, UN agencies and
researchers—although the largest group of interviewees represented
NMCPs (48 individuals). Table 1 provides a summary of interview-
ees by country and agency type represented.
The majority of interviews were conducted in the capital city of
each included country, although some district-level interviews were
conducted in Ghana, Sierra Leone and Uganda. Ethical approvals
were obtained from relevant national bodies in each country along
with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, with
informed consent obtained for individual interviews.
Stakeholder interviews followed an interview guide that aimed
to elicit descriptions of the decision-making processes involved in
malaria control (the Supplementary Interview Guide is available as
an online supplementary file). This included broad policy themed
questions aimed at providing insider descriptions of policymaking
dynamics—including the roles of stakeholders and actors within and
outside the MoH, and the steps and stages of malaria decision-
making processes. It also included questions more specifically
related to the remit of the LINK programme—such as stakeholder
understandings of prioritization and targeting in malaria, and stake-
holder views on the production and use of data for decision-making.
A final set of questions were then asked to explore the factors affect-
ing the specific use of maps and data from the LINK project and the
related ‘Information for Malaria’ (INFORM) project (these data are
analysed elsewhere).
Interviews were conducted in French and English. They were
recorded, transcribed verbatim, translated (for French interviews)
and coded both deductively—using an initial coding framework—
Table 1 Summary of respondents
Kenya Malawi DRC Mali Sierra Leone Ghana Uganda Global level
NMCP 1 5 7 5 10 8 10 0
MoH (Health information, Policies, Prevention& Control/ Research) 1 0 2 1 2 3 1 0
MoH/ District level 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 0
Gov bodies (statistical office, Pharmaceutical bodies, medical supply) 1 0 0 3 3 1 0 0
UN agencies 3 1 2 3 3 3 3 9
Donors 1 3 4 2 2 3 3 0
NGOs/CSOs 4 5 10 7 3 8 4 2
Researchers 2 4 2 2 3 2 2 0
Total 14 18 27 23 28 30 26 11
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and inductively—using content and thematic analysis, assisted with
the NVivo 11 qualitative software package. The coding framework
was organized on five initial levels: (1) evaluation of the LINK pro-
ject; (2) data production, availability and access; (3) data use and
data pathway; (4) political economy and decision-making structure;
and (5) health system. Data for this paper were principally extracted
from level the level four coding, although at times level 5 coded data
provided useful insights. Once coded, data were subsequently ana-
lysed to categorize and identify themes that could be helpful in
exploring the emergent findings in relation to factors other than pro-
vision of data or evidence that were important to shaping malaria
policy choices. After initial coding of interviews, researchers identi-
fied novel emergent findings from the study, which led to further re-
view of coded data to explore political factors shaping decisions in
more depth. From the discussions on emergent findings and second
round of data coding, it became clear that explanation for different
emergent findings could benefit from classification and exploration
along the ‘3I’s’ framework of interests, ideas and institutions (Hall,
1997; Béland, 2016) —which was then adopted as an analytical
framework to support this process and structure results of this
paper.
Political economy insights through an analytical
framework of the ‘3Is’
The initial impetus to the study was the inclusion of questions for
stakeholders that could allow exploration of political economy fac-
tors that might be important to shape malaria policy decisions. As a
starting point, a broad perspective on political economy was taken,
in line with Bump and Reich (2013) who emphasize the approach as
making ‘explicit recognition of the importance of both politics and
economics in the distribution of resources (p. 124)’. However, polit-
ical and economic relationships may manifest themselves in a num-
ber of different ways.
Smith et al. (2014) have argued that the 3I’s perspective can be
particularly helpful to understand the politics of healthcare resource
allocation, but they explain that its application has been limited in
the health sector, despite its ubiquity in the broader political science
literature. There are some examples, however, of its application to
health issues in low- and middle-income countries—with Cliff et al.
(2010) specifically analysing interests and ideas to understand the
choice between two competing malaria strategies in Mozambique,
South Africa and Zimbabwe.
Typically, the concept of interests is the most intuitive and wide-
ly recognized of the three, capturing how stakeholders pursue their
personal or collective goals in the promotion of policy decisions.
Stakeholder roles and authority was a major theme in the research
interviews, as it was recognized that a large set of domestic and
international actors can be involved in malaria control. Interest-
based analysis can raise questions around how donor interests and
pressures may clash with national autonomy and policy directions,
as noted in other global health policy examples (Okuonzi and
Macrae, 1995; Khan et al., 2018), and thus in relation to malaria, it
provided a lens of analysis to look more specifically at how the key
stakeholders known to be involved in funding or advising national
governments might have particular goals or priorities in relation to
domestic perspectives.
Turning to ideas, Parsons (2002) defines these as ‘subjective
claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the
normative legitimacy of certain actions (p. 48)’. Thus ideas can be
seen to represent collectively shared thoughts about what is the
‘right thing to do’ in relation to malaria control. This provided a
second lens of analysis, to look at coded data so as to see whether or
how collectively held ideas within the malaria control community
might be shaping decisions, or if there could be tensions in ideas as
well—such as whether ideas from outside (such as those of expert
bodies) might somehow misalign with ideas on what was needed
from the perspective of local stakeholders.
Lastly, institutions are seen to capture a range of more or
less formally organized structures, rules, processes and norms that
work to direct political behaviour and decisions (Peters, 2005) As
such, they encompass the administrative elements of national
programmes responding to malaria (i.e. NMCPs), as well as broader
national policy structures and global health arrangements
through which malaria decisions and actions are decided. This
provided the third lens of analysis to look at data to explore the
importance of formalized arrangements or structures within coun-
tries which would have developed as a result of, or in relation to,
existing funding and technical advice systems—and which appear to
play important roles in shaping malaria policy and intervention
choices.
While some authors describe the 3I’s as ‘independent variables’
for political economy analysis, in as much as they are seen to deter-
mine policy outcomes (Hay, 2004) they are not typically assumed to
be independent of one another. Rather it is recognized that they are
interdependent and often mutually reinforcing. Scholars thus note
how institutional structures may function to promote particular
interests, or how institutionalized norms can prioritize particular
ideas or logics that can drive policy action in ways other than the
pursuit of the personal interests of stakeholders (March and Olsen,
1989; Peters, 2005). Taken together, the 3I’s approach was used to
explore key dimensions of the political economy of malaria control
that existed outside purely technocratic considerations, and outside
the rational evaluation of evidence provided.
Results
The themes explored in this paper draw out ways that features of
the political economy of malaria may play out at national levels, to
provide explanations of policy choices outside of those arising from
a purely technical review of data or evidence. That said, it is worth
starting by noting that our interviews did, in fact, find that a signifi-
cant amount of decision-making at national levels involved technical
planning choices informed by reviews of relevant epidemiological or
related evidence. These captured decisions around which products
to provide for malaria treatment, whether to begin an intervention,
or where to provide an intervention. Specific examples mentioned
included: whether to provide either two or three doses of
sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine as a preventative dose (Malawi,
Kenya); where to undertake spraying of insecticides (Ghana, Sierra
Leone); whether to scale up other prevention efforts to national lev-
els (Sierra Leone, Uganda) or have Long-Lasting Insecticidal Net
(LLIN) coverage nationally (Uganda, DRC).
There were, however, several aspects of malaria decision-making
that showed how decision-making and programmatic activity often
went beyond technical considerations alone—with interviews
exploring multiple political and economic factors that appeared to
steer or direct these technical choices in ways beyond technical
reviews of data and evidence. These insights are presented below
structured along the conceptual division of the 3I’s.
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The competing interests of stakeholders
An important starting point to understanding the political realities
of malaria control is to explore the interests of the multiple stake-
holders involved. As noted, financing is primarily provided by inter-
national donor bodies and (to varying extents) from national
governments. Interviews asked respondents to describe the role of
different stakeholders involved in funding and deciding malaria con-
trol activities. Funding discussions focused on two of the largest
bodies in particular—the US’ President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI)
and the Global Fund for HIV, TB and Malaria (the Global Fund).
Some mention was made of other donors at times, however, such as
the UK Department for International Development, or UNICEF, but
with less frequency. Interviews also asked for descriptions of the var-
iety of stakeholders involved in planning and implementation of
activities. From these explanations of stakeholders and their roles,
several themes emerged in relation to the interests of the different
actors, and how stakeholders pursuing their interests could affect
the decisions and roles of national planning bodies.
Donor vs local priorities
Donor funding, in and of itself, is recognized to have implications
for local political agendas and priorities (Khan et al., 2018). Indeed,
the vertical funding of donors on disease-specific issues (through
funding bodies such as the Global Fund and others), has for many
years been critiqued for distorting national policies by creating
powerful or well-resourced groups around a preferred topic (Biesma
et al., 2009). These critiques often centre on the relative priority that
preferred topics of donor funding may achieve at national level (e.g.
the importance placed on HIV/AIDS, TB or malaria in relation to
other national health priorities). Yet there can also be intra-issue pri-
ority-setting dynamics in which the interests of donor agencies and
local stakeholders play out.
Several interviews with current or former officials working
within Ministry of Health programme offices noted how donor pri-
orities within malaria control were not always aligned with local
realities or needs. The Global Fund application processes, for in-
stance, require countries to have an updated Malaria National
Strategic Plan—from in which objectives and key activities are pri-
oritized and funding requested through a country Global Fund con-
cept note. One Malawian official, however, suggested that the
Global Fund preferred to fund commodities, with little interest in
funding behaviour change programmes needed to make them
work:
. . . commodities come first. Next is the nets. After the nets they
look at other interventions. But amongst other interventions,
BCC [behaviour change communication] comes last. . . when you
give out those nets [they] are not used, so it’s a waste. . . you’re
wasting resources. . . But unfortunately it’s not funded by Global
fund, it’s pushed last (MoH #6, Malawi).
It is worth noting that governments applying for Global Fund
grants are meant to demonstrate some co-financing, so it is pos-
sible that the Global Fund focusses on certain key commodities,
hoping the government will take up other activities. However, this
feeling of neglect of other areas was identified in interviews from
MoH officials. For instance, in DRC one former senior technical
official lamented a lack of focus on prevention in supported
programmes explaining: ‘. . .it’s good to have the drugs, but if we
do not attack things upstream, we do nothing’. Another DRC
official explained that ‘partners’ (donors) come with pre-
determined plans noting: ‘when a partner arrives, he has already
made his budget and schedule, it’s a little difficult to change (MoH
#17, DRC)’.
In Kenya, a government official reflected on how donor finance
can shape policy priorities by ensuring some health issues have
stronger data:
Let me give you a good example. HIV is the strongest because
they can review, they can print tools and then they can dissemin-
ate. They have money. . .. TB as you can see, has as a team. . . be-
cause they could be able to fund it, partners came up. . . So the
program money you think would be a lie to say that has no influ-
ence (MoH #3, Kenya).
The importance of demonstrating the impact of the intervention
was also seen to influence choices such as the selection of the indica-
tor to use to monitoring/evaluating impact or the area chosen for a
specific intervention. For instance, one development agency repre-
sentative stated that ‘[o]ur main indicator for impact is mortality
(Partner #4, Malawi)’; while another specifically explained that their
decision to moving an IRS intervention to a different region was in
order to have a larger impact (Parner #6, Mali).
Coordination of stakeholders
Initial questions asking participants to describe stakeholders and
their roles allowed identification of situations where priorities may
differ between national and national actors. However, interviews
also discussed the nature of planning and decision-making more
broadly. From these discussions, another theme emerged in relation
to stakeholder interests—specifically how non-state actors would
pursue their own interests for intervention activity in ways that
would fragment activities within a country. This could provide an-
other challenge to the idea of comprehensively rational planning at a
national level, and was recognized by a range of interviewees. One
senior government technical officer in Mali gave as an example how
within that country:
• The Global Fund, PSI (an international NGO), MEASURE
(international USAID supported agency) and other local NGOs
were active in the national concept note development;
• Service provision was provided by French and Spanish arms of
Médecins Sans Frontières, (MSF) in different regions (in a hu-
manitarian response);
• USAID was providing support via PMI and MEASURE;
• UNICEF was ‘providing’ chemo-prevention [likely meaning sup-
porting or funding in this setting];
• WHO was undertaking epidemiological surveillance;
• Canada was providing aid to the Ministry; and
• China was providing drugs (MoH # 1, Mali);
Such situations may not in fact be unusual in the health sector.
Indeed, our team of researchers noted that Mali was not unique in
this regard, with all countries showing a high number of stakehold-
ers, fragmentation of activities and multiple stakeholders involved in
Global Fund proposal writing. Other interviews conducted with
international agency staff based in country also reflected on the
multitude of non-state actors working on malaria programmatic ac-
tion: noting how international NGOs might have local branches
undertaking activities with the NMCP (Partner #1, Sierra Leone) or
how international NGOs might pilot new WHO recommendations
to then pass on to government (Partner #22, Uganda).
Almost all non-government stakeholders interviewed said that
they follow the National Malaria Strategy, they are working under
the NMCP, and they participate in the technical working groups
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(TWGs) aimed to make strategic decisions and coordinate activ-
ities—indicating some level of adhering to the interests of the recipi-
ent nation. However, a critical political economy perspective needs
to at least recognize that national strategic plans and coordinating
bodies may not necessarily perfect reflect national priorities or local
accountability—especially if their own origins may have been influ-
enced by outside stakeholders. So, e.g. TWGs regularly include
membership of non-state actors. National plans are also often devel-
oped with input from international actors, with one analysis by
Andrada et al. (2019) of malaria strategic plans in 22 countries con-
cluding that: ‘Most [national malaria] targets were set according to
global goals rather than the individual country’s previous achieve-
ments and limitations’. This may in part be due to an expectation
that national strategies should align with the global technical strat-
egy—thereby limiting the ‘room for manoeuvre’ (see Clay and
Schaffer, 1984) for a local government to truly shape priorities in a
locally defined way.
Our findings further found that non-state actors often did not
take direction on where to work or which activities to undertake
from state governments per se, even if activities fell under the broad
heading of the national strategy. The reality of such a wide number
of stakeholders involved, with differing resources and potential in-
fluence, meant that the coordination or management of stakeholders
ended up as a key responsibility of NMCPs.
The importance of this coordinating role for NMCPs was par-
ticularly apparent in response to the realities that partner agencies
would often strategically divide up countries for implementation of
activities—a situation mentioned by both government officials and
international partner agency officials in multiple countries. In
Uganda, for instance, when talking about the organization of one
specific programmatic strategy (village health teams—a form of
community health workers), one MoH official explained:
. . .it’s not uniform in all the country and being project driven we
have some funders like Malaria Consortium they go and fund in
18 district, UNICEF goes to 18 districts, USAID goes to 18 dis-
tricts. . . (MoH #5, Uganda).
In DRC, there were also reports of specific gaps in supply cover-
age due to the lack of resources combined with the division of re-
sponsibility between actors. According to a respondent from an
international partner agency:
Before, there was almost no sharing of information between dif-
ferent stakeholders around the NMCP, so you can easily find in
one province an area that has overstock convenience for malaria
control and another right next to it out of stock (Partner #25,
DRC).
It was further explained that the NMCP now works to analyse
stocks of supplies nationally, to overcome this problem. This re-
spondent noted how the NMCP acts to try to ‘rationalise’ the situ-
ation—attempting to get international actors to agree which areas
they would each focus on in a more coordinated manner.
Finally, developing and ensuring adherence to a single national
plan served as another key strategy for partner coordination as well.
As explained by a government official in Kenya:
Even the partners when they’re putting money, they’re putting
money on what the strategy has said. Whether it’s global fund,
whether it’s USAID, whether it’s DFID. It has to be what is in
the [NMCP/national] strategy (MoH #1, Kenya).
Thus, national programme actors regularly saw their interests
lying in harmonizing, coordinating, managing and aligning other
groups activities, rather than simply planning and directing pro-
gramme actions based on traditional technocratic considerations.
Clashing ideas—universal coverage vs targeting
While the interests of stakeholders help to understand some of the
realities of policymaking at a country level, interviews also were
open to allowing respondents to describe why or how decisions
were made, with probing and follow-up questions often asking for
explanations of this nature. These data allowed further analysis
along a broad theme of ideas, to analyse data discursively to see
how problems and solutions to malaria control were constructed
and understood. In our study countries, there were clearly well-
established ideas about how reviews of technical evidence and
WHO guidelines were important to integrate into national plans
and action—concepts that would align well with expectations of ra-
tional technocratic planning approaches. However, we also identi-
fied other instances where established global ideas could lead to
challenges at the local level.
The most notable of these was how the language around a glo-
bally embraced idea of ‘universal coverage’ for malaria control
could be in tension with locally experienced logics of priority setting
and targeting of activities. Priority setting is a commonly followed
process used when decision-makers have set budgets with which to
maximize health gains (Green, 2007). Yet Smith et al. (2014) have
argued that, in reality, much priority setting in health has been
driven by historical and political concerns, rather than purely tech-
nical evaluations. In the international malaria community, calls for
‘universal coverage’ have been an important rallying cry, embedded
in global reports [see chapter 3 in WHO (2011)].
The concept appears to date back to 2005 when the Roll Back
Malaria Partnership, further endorsed by the World Health
Assembly Resolution WHA 58.2 (Kiszewski et al., 2007), encour-
aged countries to implement a two-pronged malaria control ap-
proach: firstly a ‘Scale Up for Impact’ (SUFI) strategy, and secondly
maintenance of universal coverage (Campbell, 2008; Roll Back
Malaria Partnership, 2008). SUFI was enshrined in the Global
Malaria Action Plan developed in 2008 which was embedded in
many NMCPs (Steketee and Campbell, 2010). This plan has since
been superseded by newer global guidance, but at the time of our
fieldwork, the associated idea of universal coverage was still preva-
lent, and could be seen to lead to some implicit contradictions. For
example, a respondent from an international organization in Mali
stated:
Well, until proven otherwise I think we have to go with [univer-
sal coverage of interventions] because in Mali, the whole popula-
tion is at risk. It is necessary to go with the universal [coverage
of] interventions.
[INTERVIEWER: Even in the North of the country, it is not low
prevalence?]
Yes, yes. But in general terms in Mali, the whole population is at
risk (Partner #8, Mali).
In another case a Ghanaian government official explained
‘. . .everything that we do targets the whole population. . .Because
it’s a national, malaria is a national concern, a public health
concern’. Yet the individual continued by stating ‘we segment audi-
ences for various interventions. But even with that. . . we can’t single
out an individual or a particular group to reach out (MoH #6,
Ghana)’.
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Other times, however, national government officials more expli-
citly saw the push for universalism as problematic. As one Ghanaian
official explained:
. . .it shouldn’t be like one size fit all. If we’re targeting interven-
tions we should be able to tie it to the prevalence and epidemio-
logical situation. . . You don’t go distributing bad nets throughout
the country. . . We need to look at those who have lower burden
and those whose burden are higher—if you want to deploy in-
door residual spraying, we need to know where to do it, and
where not to do it (MoH #4, Ghana).
A similar view was expressed by a researcher in Uganda:
. . .we need to be smart at how we target our limited resources be-
cause you know why should you put the same intensity of inter-
vention in an area that has less than 1% and another one has
50% parasitaemia. . . (Researcher #4, Uganda).
These tensions reflect the obvious need to allocate limited resour-
ces within a global rhetoric that presses for universal coverage—but
which may remain unclear or unspecified when local officials at-
tempt to apply the concept in practice. National programmes are be-
holden to international funding bodies, and those bodies have used
the ‘universal coverage’ idea to justify higher levels of global finance.
Yet while many NMCPs do wish to cover the entire population, in
the realities of national settings, targeting high-risk groups was often
seen as an essential reality.
Institutionalization of processes and systems
The final element of the 3I’s framework focuses on institutions—the
structures, processes or norms formalized within national pro-
grammes that can influence malaria control decisions and actions.
In our analysis, we identified two emergent examples that pointed to
the importance of institutionalized systems playing important roles
in shaping malaria decisions, or decision-making, over time.
The first was how the influence over policy and action by non-state
actors (the interests of stakeholders) could become institutionalized
into malaria planning systems. The second was how the
established structures of malaria response risked undermining devel-
opment of local capacity in ways that could hinder the idea of a
country simply assessing evidence in a rational technical planning
manner.
The first of these reflects Harrison’s (2001) idea of ‘post-condi-
tionality’—the formalization of systems of planning and decision-
making in aid-dependent countries that work to embed mechanisms
of policy influence beyond simple conditions applied to aid financ-
ing. The aforementioned normalization of the process of dividing
countries up for donor activities, or the long-term acceptance of the
high number of implementing partners, could be seen to reflect such
institutionalization. As already discussed, this can result in NMCPs
serving more as coordinator or manager of activities, rather than
directly deciding or controlling activities.
Our case studies provided further details, however, on how pol-
icy influence could be institutionalized. For example, in Uganda,
and Mali there was the establishment of a Ministry of Health pos-
ition under the NMCP to serve as ‘coordinator of the Global
Fund’—providing further legitimacy to the coordination function
and reliance on outside actors. Another way that international influ-
ence could be formalized into planning processes, however, was
through the reliance on TWGs. TWGs were often established as the
key bodies reviewing technical evidence and directing interventions,
yet they typically have formal membership from researchers, pro-
gramme partners, and implementing bodies alike. As noted above,
they are often presented as the mechanism through which stakehold-
ers can be coordinated, yet in some countries, TWGs themselves are
set up on the recommendation of international bodies such as the
WHO (2005). They further typically contain representatives of
international partners, raising questions about how much they can
be taken to reflect purely local priorities or stewardship.
In Kenya, a researcher interviewed explained:
it is the technical working groups that meet and discuss specific
issues to do with policy direction and implementation . . . Then
the technical working group will feed into the Malaria Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee. . . These working groups are
the key drivers of malaria control (Researcher #10, Kenya).
Similarly in Uganda, TWG ‘sub-groups’ were set up to direct
more specific activities. One government official described the TWG
for malaria in pregnancy:
its attended by all key stakeholders like for example all imple-
menting partners that are carrying out activities for Malaria in
Pregnancy prevention sends in their representatives to attend that
meeting WHO is also on the lead. . . we check performance we
do update ourselves and do planning on what we want to do in
the next quarter (MoH #8, Uganda).
In the Kenyan case, others explained how influence could play
out through the TWG. An NGO representative explained:
I think there are certainly some partners who are more influential
when it comes to making decisions. One, because of, I think, the
contribution they bring to the table in terms of technical know-
ledge, but also the resources they bring to the table. So I mean
for example, WHO is very influential, you know they have been
given that space of [technical assistance] and the ministry
respects that . . . DFID has not been influential at all in the
malaria’s phase in this country because although they have put in
a lot of resources, nobody sits from DFID in the TWGs . . . PMI
are on the table influencing decisions including decisions to do
with the Global Fund. So they also influence how Global Fund
resources [will be used]. . . (Partner #6, Kenya).
Finally, in Malawi a sentiment was expressed that TWGs were
now supporting the NMCP in key ways: ‘it’s basically now that in-
stead of the program just doing things on their own but it’s basically
the involvement of other partners throughout these technical work-
ing groups (Partner #14, Malawi)’.
Thus while there may be good reasons to establish TWGs in sit-
uations involving a range of funding bodies and stakeholder service
provision, their establishment alters the decision-making institution-
al space—formalizing and embedding the influence non-state bodies
can have over national malaria policy.
Local capacity challenges
The final institutional theme identified raised in our interviews cap-
tured concerns about local capacity in the country. While it is often
argued that low-income settings face capacity challenges, it was also
clear that systems were routinely followed which allocated planning
elements to external bodies, or which maintained a more limited
role of national bodies. As such, key processes and activities that
were institutionalized within the country could themselves perpetu-
ate the idea, or even the continuation, of local capacity limitations—
e.g. if the routine bypassing of local stakeholders or use of alterna-
tive systems of planning removes opportunities for local capacity to
develop. For example, in Malawi, a researcher explained that a
change in national drug treatment policy could not come from
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within the country due to the lack of a relevant local body that could
undertake data analysis:
that change in policy is not because Malawi . . . had a coordinated
way of saying this is what we want, but what had happened is
studies were conducted in Malawi and outside Malawi and then
later data was sent to WHO. And it was WHO that came with
the final decision . . . even . . . the data that were collected in
Malawi there was no particular platform that could synthesize
those data . . . (Researcher #5, Malawi).
Alternatively, in Uganda, a government official noted their lack
of ability to align partners:
having this small structure is not enough . . . if you are empow-
ered and technical you would be able to control the partner if
you like that partner to do but since you are at a low level the
aligning then becomes difficult they are the ones with the money
you see its difficult so you find the system becomes weak because
you cannot control those (MoH #6, Uganda).
Finally, an interviewee in Sierra Leone described the limited role
taken by the government when a programme for preventative treat-
ment in infants was being developed, explaining how it was WHO
involved in piloting, UNICEF in scaling up and ICAP (an inter-
national NGO linked to Colombia University) who did the monitor-
ing and evaluation—while the Ministry of Health managed training
(Partner #19, Sierra Leone).
Discussion
Our analysis utilized the perspective of interests, ideas and institu-
tions to explore the political and economic realities of malaria con-
trol that can influence policy and practice at a national level, beyond
reviews of technical evidence alone. Many of the issues identified
appeared to be in response to the specific global and national con-
texts of malaria control, however. In particular, the funding land-
scape is dominated by a small number of key agencies (with the
Global Fund particularly dominant), leading to significant scope for
influence; while implementation of malaria control is typified by a
large number of stakeholders, leading to issues in coordination and
clarity in government roles. Global malaria efforts further are domi-
nated by a relatively circumscribed body of experts shaping global
thinking and directions in malaria policy which can then be dissemi-
nated to countries.
The heavy reliance on the Global Fund—a globally pooled
source of funding—could arguably make countries more susceptible
to funding body interests, as it places countries in a weaker position
than might be the case when there are multiple donors with which a
country can negotiate. Mosley et al. (1995), for instance, have
described conditional aid lending (by the World Bank) as a ‘game’
situation whereby both parties are bargaining to maximize their
interests, and give up the least. More recently, Manning (2006) and
Sato et al. (2011) have both argued that proliferation of donors can
give countries greater options or improve outcomes; and in one spe-
cific health example, Han and Koenig-Archibugi (2015) found that
a multiplicity of donors in aid-recipient countries was correlated
with lower child mortality rates then when fewer donors were active
(this result held unto a point, however, after which increased diver-
sity of donors appeared to raise mortality rates again).
Multiple lenders can thus potentially provide more options, and
more appropriate or effective options in cases where single lenders
may have little reason to consider alternative approaches. Single lend-
er situations also can place national programmes in awkward
positions if the interests of key donor agencies simply differ from na-
tional priorities as well (regardless of effectiveness). Donor agencies
may also have dominant ideas around how to address particular
health issues—as seen in one analysis by Steele (2011) who found
health donors particularly favouring direct prevention and treatment
activities over broader infrastructure, research or educational efforts.
The funding landscape thus heavily shapes which interests of
what stakeholders are brought to bear on malaria control efforts, as
well as which ideas are promoted. The nature of the international
expert network guiding global malaria action can further play im-
portant roles in shaping collective ideas—such as the importance of
universal coverage, promoted globally as part of overarching efforts
to scale up malaria control. Such ideas may be useful for global
agenda setting, but risk contrasting with local realities, where tech-
nical planning approaches will typically mean officials need to con-
sider the most effective use of limited resources. Indeed, the idea of
‘universal coverage’ appears to mean different things to different
people—from ‘everyone, everywhere, irrespective of epidemiology
being covered’; to ‘those most vulnerable having universal access’
(such as under 5’s or pregnant women); to ‘those in particular epi-
demiological strata having 100% coverage of specific preventative
strategies’. Although, universal access to diagnosis and treatment
does appear to have a common interpretation of testing for all, out-
side of this, ‘universal coverage’ is still an idea that needs further
clarity and nuancing, especially if it is being used to justify funding
and shape policy and practice.
While there may be only a limited number of funders and global
health expert networks, the contrasting large number of non-state
stakeholders involved in implementation of activities was found to
result in additional challenges and impacts on national bodies.
NMPCs often saw their roles as involving management and coordin-
ation of non-government stakeholders, rather than more typical
technical planning or service provision. In our study, the institution-
alization of particular modes of planning and responding to malaria,
in relation to these dynamics, had further implications for national
control over policy agendas or capacity to respond. These findings
align with observations of other more politicized global health issues
as well. Work looking at HIV/AIDS, for instance, has argued that re-
liance on multiple global actors who delegate implementation to dis-
tant bodies can undermine governance systems in local settings,
with misalignment between donor bodies and local priorities or
changing expectations by the public about what social services the
government can or should provide (Dionne, 2017). While the pre-
sent study did not explore beyond the malaria control sector, it rein-
forces concerns about how local needs and priorities may be
affected when international stakeholder influence is institutionalized
into public health responses.
Conclusion
NMCPs sit at the heart of malaria responses in countries. They are
mandated by Ministries of Health to take responsibility for malaria
control, and typically staffed by technical staff—public health and
infectious disease officials who strive to use data and evidence to se-
lect the most effective package of activities possible. Yet this highly
technocratic exercise cannot be divorced from the contextual real-
ities of the local policy environments. Political economy factors pro-
vide a set of challenges (and opportunities) for action, placing
planners in a decision-making tunnel that constrains their actions in
certain dimensions. Even if provided with robust data and epidemio-
logical evidence that could guide planning activities, NMCPs must
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undertake malaria control efforts within the established systems and
structures that connect sources of funding, implementing agencies
and technical advice to national systems.
This paper has analysed qualitative data that aimed to investi-
gate the stakeholders and processes involved in malaria planning
from an explicitly political perspective. The 3I’s of ideas, interests
and institutions was applied to the data to provide conceptual cate-
gories for thematic analysis. Interests were explored in relation to
the multiple stakeholders involved in funding and implementing
malaria control efforts, highlighting how donor priorities may not
align with local needs per se, and the coordination challenges this
can place on local authorities. Ideas, on the other hand, permitted
deeper exploration of how dominant concepts about the ‘right thing
to do’ in malaria control could lead to challenges at times—such as
when global concepts of universal coverage had to be applied within
constrained local contextual realities. Finally, an institutional lens
allowed consideration of how the systems and structures constructed
to plan and implement national responses could both reflect, and
embed, political and economic influence from non-state actors.
Malaria remains one of the leading contributors to premature
mortality in the world and a critical global health priority. While
technical interventions including drugs, mosquito nets and insecti-
cide spraying remain central to malaria control, policy and program-
matic action must be made at country level to ensure an effective use
of those strategies to achieve success. Technical as it may seem, the
practical realities of malaria control evolve within specific contexts
of political and economic forces that shape both what is possible
what remains a challenge, and which interests shape national
responses to the disease.
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